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A recent study has explored the interplay between language and
perception through the brain’s visual pathways. The results suggest an
influence of linguistic categories on the speed of colour discrimination.Mikhail Masharov and
Martin H. Fischer
One of the fundamental debates
in cognitive research is about the
extent to which our language
influences or constrains our
perception. Students of human
cognition usually encounter this
long-standing debate first in the
light of the radical proposal by
Benjamin Whorf that ‘‘we dissect
nature along lines laid down by
our native languages.’’ [1]. In its
strong version, this ‘Whorfian
hypothesis’ of linguistic
determination of cognition has
been refuted as we can perceive
objects and events that have no
corresponding words in our mental
lexicon. For example, New Guinea
aborigines discriminate the colours
green and blue even though they
have only one lexical entry to
describe both colours [2].
In its weaker form, however,
the proposal that language
influences our thinking — linguistic
relativity — has frequently been
resurrected. Studies of colour
perception [2,3], categorization
[4,5], and numerical cognition [6],
among many others, support this
view, while others do not [7,8]. The
Whorfian hypothesis has recently
received attention following the
report of limited numerical abilities
in Amazonian Indians whose
language includes only three
number words [9]. Contrary to the
Whorfian prediction, however, their
numerical performance with large
sets of objects was found to becomparable to that of French
controls when more appropriate
tests were used [10,11].
The issue of making use of
appropriate testing methodologies
has plagued research into linguistic
relativity, with many results turning
out to be task-dependant [7,8].
Recent approaches with implicit
test measures have addressed this
concern and also allowed for
performance comparisons within
subjects, as opposed to the
traditional between-subjects
designs. For example, memory for
arbitrary object–name pairs, such
as ‘apple–Patricia’, is better when
the gender of the proper name is
congruent with the grammatical
gender of the object name than
when the two genders are
incongruent [4].
Gilbert et al. [12] have now
followed up on the idea of using
implicit test measures and added
a neuro-anatomical dimension to
the idea of linguistic relativity. The
authors tested the Whorfian
hypothesis by presenting different
visual information to the two brain
hemispheres of their participants.
Because of structural
characteristics of the visual
pathways in the brain, stimuli that
are presented on the right side of
the current point of eye fixation —
in the right visual field— are initially
projected to the left cerebral
hemisphere, while those presented
in the left half of the visual field are
projected to the right cerebral
hemisphere [13]. This contralateral
projection seems to apply to thewhole retinal image, including
foveated stimuli [14], but it does not
generally lead to performance
asymmetries, because of frequent
eye-movements (two or three per
second) and rich inter-hemispheric
neural connections. There is,
however, a well-documented right
visual field advantage in
recognition of briefly presented
printed words, which is attributable
to the dominance of the left
hemisphere for language
processing [15]. By presenting
slightly different visual inputs to the
two hemispheres, Gilbert et al. [12]
were able to show that language
makes different contributions to
the perception of colour in the left
and right visual fields.
This new work was based on
a visual search task. Each of the
experiments was preceded by a
colour-naming test to select
right-handed participants who
exhibited categorical perception
of four colour patches with
equidistant hues — A, B, C and
D — by labelling them ‘green’,
‘green’, ‘blue’ and ‘blue’,
respectively. The main experiment
involved presenting, in each trial,
a circle of 12 colour patches
centered around the fixation point.
One patch was a different colour
than the rest, and participants
indicated with two buttons whether
this target was on the left or right
side of their fixation point.
Importantly, the target and
distractor patches both belonged
to either the same colour
category — pairings AB or CD;
within-category trials — or to
different categories — AC, AD, BC
or BD; between-category trials.
The authors compared search
speed for perceptual neighbours
AB, BC, and CD, asking whether
the pair BC would have an
advantage over the other pairings
because B and C are on different
sides of a linguistic category
boundary.
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Figure 1. Schematic processing within the left hemisphere.
Discriminability is (A) reduced when the two colours belong to the same linguistic cat-
egory (Green–Green), and (B) increased when they belong to different linguistic cate-
gories (Green–Blue).Given the contralateral nature
of visual projections to the cortex,
Gilbert et al. [12] predicted that
information from the right visual
field would initially be more
susceptible to modulation by
lexical representations in the left
hemisphere. Therefore, the effect
of language on perceptual
discrimination should be seen
primarily for stimuli in the right
visual field — colour discrimination
should be faster for colour patches
with different labels (BC), because
their lexical distinction should
enhance the perceptual difference.
Additionally, discrimination
between colours from the same
lexical category should be slower
in the right visual field than in the
left visual field because the
assignment of the same name to
two colours should diminish their
discriminability (Figure 1).
The main finding upheld these
predictions — the results showed
a faster search for between-
category trials (BC) than for
within-category trials (AB or CD),
but only when the target patch
appeared on the right side of the
observer’s fixation point. This was
interpreted as a right visual field
advantage for between-category
search, attributable to the
left-hemispheric language
specialization and the resultingadditional linguistic discriminability
of the colours. This interpretation
received support from control
experiments in which a verbal
load — for example, remembering
a list of eight digits— abolished the
right visual field advantage
whereas a visual load —
remembering a random pattern —
did not. On the other hand, the right
visual field advantage was
reversed rather than just levelled
under verbal load. This raises
a question about whether the
verbal task blocked the linguistic
influence on the perceptual
discrimination process, or instead
made the search more difficult by
interfering with the processing of
lexical information. While Gilbert
et al. [12] acknowledge that their
results do not clearly discriminate
between perceptual and
post-perceptual interpretations of
the categorical effect, it is clear that
their methodology has promise
for future research.
These new results fit nicely into
an emerging bigger picture of
functional segregation of cognition
in the human brain, both within and
between hemispheres [16–18].
Po¨ppel and Wittmann [17] have
suggested that, in addition to
imposing a serialization of
processing, the left hemisphere is
specialized for fast and analyticalprocessing while the right
hemisphere specializes in slow and
integrative processing. A similar
view is that of hemispheric
specialization for local versus
global processing [18]. In contrast
with the results reported by Gilbert
et al. [12], however, a recent review
[19] did not find significant
differences in competition between
lexical and colour information
within each of the two hemispheres
when performing the Stroop task. It
is clear that new approaches to
the study of the relationship
between brain and language
(see http://www.ynic.york.ac.uk/
rtn-lab) are likely to keep the
debate alive and help paint the
picture of the linguistic influence
over perception.
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As the architects of phenomenal
feats of engineering, from the Great
Wall of China to the Taj Mahal to
New York city, we humans often
fail to realise that other species are
also impressive engineers in their
own way. Countless animals
manufacture nests, burrows, holes,
webs and pupal cases; plants
change levels of atmospheric
gases and modify nutrient cycles;
fungi and bacteria decompose
organic matter; even bacteria fix
nutrients. These activities
collectively are known as niche
construction, the capacity of living
creatures to shape their worlds [1].
New research on the policing
behaviour of high-status monkeys
brings the study of niche
construction into a whole new
domain [2].
We flatter ourselves that human
beings uniquely control the planet,
and there is no doubting that
human engineering and technology
has taken niche construction to
its zenith. Yet dated at 3.6 billion
years ago, the first fossil evidence
of life, preserved in rock as
laminated structures known as
stromatolites, is a manifestation of
the niche-constructing activities
of microbial mats, which played
a vital part in constructing the
Earth’s oxygenated atmosphere.
While the fact that organisms
engage in niche construction is
widely recognized, the evolutionary
and ecological significance of
this activity has only recently
received attention [1]. Currently,
niche-construction is the focus of
vigorous debates within the fieldsprocessing: A possible role of
interhemispheric interaction. Brain Cog.
45, 97–118.
19. Belanger, H., and Cimino, C. (2002).
The lateralized Stroop: A meta-analysis
and its implications for models of
semantic processing. Brain Lang. 83,
384–402.: Old World
w World Order
hat policing behaviour by dominant
acaque societies.
of evolutionary biology and
ecology, precipitated by a small
but rapidly growing group of
biologists who seek recognition
of niche construction as a
fundamental biological process.
Advocates of this viewpoint argue
that there is both accuracy and
utility in treating niche construction
as a major evolutionary process in
its own right, rather than as merely
a product of evolution. Evolution
is regarded as based on networks
of causation and feedback in which
organisms drive environmental
change and organism-modified
environments subsequently
select organisms.
If you take a close look at an
earthworm, for instance, you would
see that these manifestly terrestrial
creatures are structurally very
poorly adapted to cope with
physiological problems such as
water and salt balance on land, and
they would seem to belong in
a freshwater habitat [3]. That is
because earthworms have retained
their ancestral freshwater kidneys,
evolving few of the structural
adaptations one would expect to
see in an animal living on land. They
survive in a terrestrial environment
by building their own private
swimming pools: that is, by
tunnelling, exuding mucus and
eliminating calcite, which produces
well-aggregated soils with
weakened matric potentials,
allowing them to draw water into
their bodies. Through their
burrowing activities, earthworms
dramatically change the structure
and chemistry of the soils in which
they live, often on a huge scale [4].
This example highlights a problemPsychology Department, University of
Dundee, Dundee DD1 4HN, Scotland,
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this case it is the soil that does the
changing, rather than the worm, to
meet the demands of the worm’s
freshwater physiology [3]. So what
is adapting to what? Advocates of
the niche construction perspective
feel that standard evolutionary
theory short-changes the active
role of organisms in constructing
their environments.
Hitherto, niche construction
theory has been largely restricted
to the ecological and evolutionary
domains: organisms modify
resource distributions and natural
selection pressures, with knock-on
consequences for ecological
dynamics and evolutionary
trajectories. But a highly innovative
recent paper by Jessica Flack and
colleagues [2] has pioneered the
application of niche-construction
to the social sphere. Flack is
a primatologist who studies
a captive population of pigtail
macaques, monkeys indigenous to
South East Asia. These macaques
live in large, mixed-sex groups,
with each monkey regularly
interacting with a subset of the
individuals with whom they play,
groom, forage, and so forth. These
other individuals can be regarded
as providing a set of commodities,
or services, that are in many
respects social equivalents to the
set of ecological resources and
conditions — prey availability,
temperature, humidity and so
forth — that characterize an
organism’s ecological niche.
Flack et al. [2] argue that, in the
same way that the ecological
niche can usefully be treated as
frequency distributions of the
resources used by a population, so
the social niche can be viewed as
composed of networks of social
services provided by individuals.
An attractive feature of this
conception is that it allows the
complex set of social interactions
that underlie primate societies to
be quantified, and sets the scene
